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A new protocol for quantum key distribution based on entanglement swapping is presented. In
this protocol, both certain key and random key can be generated without any loss of security. It
is this property differs our protocol from the previous ones14. The rate of generated key bits per
particle is improved which can approach six bits (4 random bits and 2 certain bits) per four particles.
PACS numbers: 03.67.-a, 42.50.Dv, 85.25.Dq
In cryptography, a message is uneavesdropped to any
eavesdroppers. To achieve this goal, the message is com-
bined with a key to produce a cryptogram. For a cipher
to be secure, it should be impossible to unlock the cryp-
togram without the key. In this sense, the security of
the cipher depends on the security of the key, which is
difficult to be assured by classical means. Quantum cryp-
tography, also called quantum key distribution (QKD), is
defined as a procedure, in which two legitimate commu-
nicators can establish a sequence of key bits secretly and
any unauthorized user can be detected. Since the BB84
protocol[1],the first quantum key distribution scheme,
was proposed, various quantum encryption schemes have
been proposed such as B92 protocol[2] , the EPR proto-
col[3] and other protocols[4-11]. All these protocols for
QKD produce random key bits, the security of the pro-
tocols is assured by this way. Here we propose a new
QKD scheme in which not only random key bits, but
also certain key bits can be generated without any loss
of security.
In this paper, we present a new protocol for quantum
key distribution based on entanglement swapping. In our
proposed protocol, Alice only transports 2 particles to
Bob, she can share 6 bits, which include 2 certain bits and
4 random bits, with Bob secretly. This protocol brings
some merits over the previous protocols, for example, the
use efficiency can approach 100%
To illustrate our new protocol for QKD, we explain the
process of entanglement swapping first.
It has been proposed by Zukowski et al.[13] for two
pairs of entangled particles with each pair in one of the
Bell states. Entanglement swapping works as follows.
Consider two pairs of
entangled particles 1, 2, 3 and 4, prepared in Bell states
respectively |φ+〉
12
and |ψ−〉
34
. If a Bell operator mea-
surement is performed on particles 2 and 3, then we have
|Ψ〉
1234
=
∣∣φ+〉
12
⊗
∣∣ψ−〉
34
=
1
2
{
∣∣φ+〉
23
∣∣ψ−〉
14
+
∣∣φ−〉
23
∣∣ψ+〉
14
−
∣∣ψ+〉
23
∣∣φ−〉
14
−
∣∣ψ−〉
23
∣∣φ+〉
14
} (1)
As is obvious, from above equation, the four possible re-
sults |φ+〉
23
,|φ−〉
23
,|ψ+〉
23
and |ψ−〉
23
occur with same
probability and the outcome of each measurement is
purely random. Suppose that the result |φ+〉
23
is ob-
tained, the state of the pair 1 and 4 after the measure-
ment is consequently |ψ−〉
14
. Which means particles 1
and 4 become entangled although they have never inter-
acted.
Recently, the entanglement swapping between two
pairs of qubits has been used to realize schemes for quan-
tum key distribution[9]. Which do not need the legiti-
mate users to choose between possible measurements to
generate the key and assure the security. But only ran-
dom key bits can be produced in these schemes.
Our scheme, illustrated in Fig. 1, can be described as
follows.
Alice has a EPR source. She can apply a local opera-
tion X , where X ∈ {σ0,σ1,σ2,σ3} on her particles. Alice
and Bob agree beforehand as following encoding
∣∣φ+〉→ 00,. ∣∣ψ+〉→ 01, ∣∣ψ−〉→ 10, ∣∣φ−〉→ 11 (2)
where|φ±〉 and |ψ±〉 are Bell states.
σ0 → 00,σ1 → 01,σ2 → 10,σ3 → 11 (3)
They can perform series of operations as following,
1. Alice creates EPR pairs and sends some of her par-
ticles to Bob.
2Alice creates two EPR pairs |φ+〉
12
and |φ+〉
34
, she
sent particles 2 and 4 to
Bob,and tells Bob the state in which the particles are.
2. Alice applies a local operation on particle 1.
Let the initial state of particles 1 and 2 be |φ+〉12AB, and
the state of particles 3 and 4 be |φ+〉34AB. Alice performs
a local operation σ1 on particle 1 and thus, the state
|φ+〉12AB is turned into |ψ+〉
12
AB.
3. Alice makes a Bell operator measurement on parti-
cles 1 and 3. We assume that the result of Alice’s mea-
surement as |ψ−〉13AA, then she can infer the state of par-
ticles 2 and 4 as |φ−〉24BB by the following equation,
|Φ〉1234ABAB =
∣∣ψ+〉12
AB
⊗
∣∣φ+〉34
AB
=
1
2
{
∣∣φ+〉13
AA
∣∣ψ+〉24
BB
−
∣∣φ−〉13
AA
∣∣ψ−〉24
BB
+
∣∣ψ+〉13
AA
∣∣φ+〉24
BB
−
∣∣ψ−〉13
AA
∣∣φ−〉24
BB
}(4)
4. Alice calculates which state of particles 1 and 3
should be without local operation applied on particle 1
when the EPR state of particles 2 and 4 is |φ−〉24BB .
|Φ〉1234ABAB =
∣∣φ+〉12
AB
⊗
∣∣φ+〉34
AB
=
1
2
{
∣∣φ+〉13
AA
∣∣φ+〉24
BB
+
∣∣φ−〉13
AA
∣∣φ−〉24
BB
+
∣∣ψ+〉13
AA
∣∣ψ+〉24
BB
+
∣∣ψ−〉13
AA
∣∣ψ−〉24
BB
}(5)
From Eq.(5), Alice get the state of particles 1 and 3
as |φ−〉13AA, compared this result with expression(3), she
decodes the bits as 11.
5. Alice tells Bob she has made a Bell operator mea-
surement on her particles 1 and 3 ,but without mention
the result of her measurement through classical channel.
6. Bob performs a Bell operator measurement on par-
ticles 2 and 4 and infers the outcomes of Alice’s measure-
ment.
From the calculation of entanglement swapping, we
know, after Alice has performed a Bell operator on par-
ticles 1 and 3, Bob’s measurement result of his particles
should be |φ−〉24BB. Note that the result of Alice’s mea-
surement inferred by Bob is the corresponding state de-
termined using Eq.(5). Because Bob does not know the
exact state of entangled pair 1 and 2 after Alice subjects
her particle 1 to a local operation. What he can do is
to use known information: entangled pairs |φ+〉12AB and
|φ+〉34AB, to calculate the state particles 1 and 3 is in. In
this case, it is |φ−〉13AA, which can be decoded as 11.
7.Bob asks Alice’s corresponding outcome of her Bell
operator measurement on particles 1 and 3 by classical
channel. He knows the Bell operator measurement of
particles 1 and 3 is |ψ−〉13AA.
8. Bob compares the measurement result of particles 1
and 3 announced by Alice with his calculation result, and
he will find what the Alice’s local operation on particle
1 is
|ψ−〉13AA σ1←→|φ−〉
13
AA, Bob gets the local operation is
σ1. Then he knows the certain bits
is 01. Obviously, both Alice and Bob know the state
|φ−〉24BB and the imaginary state of particles 1 and 3 as
|φ−〉13AA secretly. Thus they establish the random key bits
11 at the same time.
Bob makes another ES calculation as eq.(5), he obtain
the imaginary states of particles 1 and 3 as |ψ−〉13AA. He
decodes the random bits as 10.
They perform above procedures on each group of par-
ticles repeat.
9. Bob told Alice some his qubits, Alice will be sure if
there is any eavesdropper.
Then Alice and Bob securely share the certain key bit
and the random key.
I. SECURITY
Security is an important issue of QKD. One protocol
for QKD is said to be secure if it can either generate the
key secretly or stops the protocol when any eavesdrop-
pers appear. In this section, we proof that our proposed
protocol is secure, even if the shared quantum channels
are public.
First, we consider the security of the random key which
is encoded in the outcomes of Bob’s measurement and the
calculation result of ”Alice’s measurement”assuming that
she does not apply any local operations on her particle.
Where the symbol ””implies that Alice does not really
apply this measurement and get the outcome, it is just
an imaginary measurement. After Alice has performed
a local operation on particle 1 and a Bell operator mea-
surement, no eavesdroppers can gain any information,
although Alice announces publicly her Bell measurement
result on particles 1 and 3. The reason is that no one
except Alice knows exactly the entangled states of par-
ticles 1 and 2 once Alice performs a local operation on
her particle. There is only a probability of 1
4
to guess the
correct EPR state in which particles 1 and 2 are in. If
Eve eavesdrops 4n key bits , she tends to succeed with
a probability of
(
1
4
)n
which approaches 0 and n is suffi-
ciently large. Further, if Eve is so clever that she shares
the quantum channels with Alice and Bob, or replaces
the particles in transit to Alice and Bob by the particles
prepared by her, she can succeed in eavesdropping with
probability 1
2
or 1
4
respectively. This has been certified
by us in[14]. Then Bob can send some results to Alice to
detect the action of Eve and thus, Eve cannot gain any
information of the random key.
Now turns to the problem of the certain key which is
encoded in the local operations performed by Alice on
her particle. It is available to Bob by comparing the
state of particles 1 and 3 gotten by Bob with the result
announced by Alice. Thus the security of the certain key
3depends on whether Bob can secretly infer the correct
corresponding state of particles 1 and 3 using the entan-
glement swapping between two initial shared entangled
pairs. In our previous work[14], we showed that it is
impossible for any eavesdroppers to know the Bell op-
erator measurement results by innerspring the transmis-
sion. More detail, Eve cannot determine the outcomes
of the sender and receiver’s measurements in which the
key is encoded, no matter what methods Eve may choose.
There is a probability of 1
2
to gain the correct information
on the key when Eve tries to share the quantum com-
munication channels with Alice and Bob, and a success
probability of 1
4
by replacing the particles transported to
legitimate users by the particles accessible to her. This is
a useful conclusion even for this different protocol. That
is to say, Eve can eavesdrop no information of the certain
key.
This protocol is secure, even the shared entangled
states are public (in another words, everyone know that
the Alice and Bob shared states are |φ+〉AB ). If Al-
ice and Bob do not publish their’s measured result,
eavesdropper (Eve) can not get the information from
the known entangled channels. For example, both the
quantum channels are the same Bell states |φ+〉12AB and
|φ+〉34AB. By the entanglement swapping calculation, we
know the state of these entangled particles are
|Φ〉1234ABAB =
1
2
{∣∣φ+〉13
AA
∣∣φ+〉24
BB
+
∣∣φ−〉13
AA
∣∣φ−〉24
BB
+
∣∣ψ+〉13
AA
∣∣ψ+〉24
BB
+
∣∣ψ−〉13
AA
∣∣ψ−〉24
BB
.(6)
So the four Bell-operator measurement outcomes of Al-
ice are equally likely, each occurring with probability 1
4
.
Yet the eavesdropper can not get any information, al-
though she owned many entangled pairs in state |φ+〉EE .
If the Eve was smart enough, she made the state
|φ+〉′ABE = 1√2 (|00〉AB |α〉E + |11〉AB |β〉E) instead of
|φ+〉AB, when Alice made a joint measurement on parti-
cle 1 and particle 3, the state become
|Ψ〉123456ABE
=
∣∣φ+〉′
ABE
⊗ ∣∣φ+〉′
ABE
=
1
2
√
2
{∣∣φ+〉13
AA
(
∣∣φ+〉24
BB
∣∣φ+〉56
EE
+
∣∣φ−〉24
BB
∣∣φ−〉56
EE
)
+(
∣∣φ−〉13
AA
∣∣φ+〉24
BB
∣∣φ−〉56
EE
+
∣∣φ−〉24
BB
∣∣φ+〉56
EE
)
+(
∣∣ψ+〉13
AA
∣∣ψ+〉24
BB
∣∣ψ+〉56
EE
+
∣∣ψ−〉24
BB
∣∣ψ−〉56
EE
)
+
∣∣ψ−〉13
AA
(
∣∣ψ+〉24
BB
∣∣ψ−〉56
EE
+
∣∣ψ−〉24
BB
∣∣ψ+〉56
EE
)}.(7)
Compare eq.[3] with eq.[4] , we found if there is an
eavesdropper, there is only 1
2
probability that the two
result are same. Bob can send some result random to
Alice, then Alice can know there is eavesdropper with
different result, they give up this key. Namely, Eve can
not gain any information about the key.
If Eve shared the entangled pairs |φ+〉ijAE with Alice
instead of Bob, Eve shared entangled pairs |φ+〉i
/j/
EB with
Bob, before the key distribution, both Alice and Bob do
not know this. Then the process of key distribution
become
|Φ〉1234AEAE =
1
2
{∣∣φ+〉13
AA
∣∣φ+〉24
EE
+
∣∣φ−〉13
AA
∣∣φ−〉24
EE
+
∣∣ψ+〉13
AA
∣∣ψ+〉24
EE
+
∣∣ψ−〉13
AA
∣∣ψ−〉24
EE
}(8)
and
∣∣∣Φ/
〉1/2/3/4/
EBEB
=
1
2
{
∣∣φ+〉1
/
3
/
EE
∣∣φ+〉2
/
4
/
BB
+
∣∣φ−〉1
/
3
/
EE
∣∣φ−〉2
/
4
/
BB
+
∣∣ψ+〉1
/
3
/
EE
∣∣ψ+〉2
/
4
/
BB
+
∣∣ψ−〉1
/
3
/
EE
∣∣ψ−〉2
/
4
/
BB
}(9)
From Eq.(5) and Eq.(6), we know that, the probability,
which Bell operator measurement of particle 1 and 3 is
same as particle 1/ and 3/, is only 1
4
, when Bob send
some his measurement results to Alice, Alice can find if
there is eavesdropper.
So this protocol is secret and secure.
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